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Police Pursuits. The idea brings to mind thoughts of bank robbers ﬂeeing from the police after
commiퟘ�ing a daring heist, only to be pursued by inept cops that wind up crashing into each other as the
robbers drive away in perfect Hollywood fashion. However, police pursuits are rarely as glamorous and
thrilling. In reality, they are terrifying and dangerous. In fact, according to the National Highway Traﬃc
Safety Administration (hퟘ�p://www.nhtsa.gov/) (NHTSA) more than 5,000 bystanders or passengers have
been killed in police pursuits since 1979
In recent years there has been a call for police departments to limit their pursuit of ﬂeeing suspects. A
simple google search reveals the continuous calls for police to stop pursuing suspects unless they are
considered dangerous or commiퟘ�ed known violent felonies. For instance, in Jackson, Mississippi,
Councilman Kenneth Stokes (hퟘ�p://wjtv.com/2016/01/01/jackson‑councilman‑under‑ﬁre‑for‑telling‑
citizens‑to‑throw‑rocks‑at‑police/), in reference to police pursuits coming into his ward, went as far to
suggest to the local population “[l]et’s get rocks, let’s get bricks and let’s get boퟘ�les and start throwing
them and then [police] won’t come in here anymore.” Similarly, in Washington D.C., Charlie Vivereퟘ�e’s

them and then [police] won’t come in here anymore.” Similarly, in Washington D.C., Charlie Vivereퟘ�e’s
mother claimed (hퟘ�p://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/30/police‑pursuits‑fatal‑
injuries/30187827/) police should not have been chasing the suspect that hit her son, killing him. Like
Charlie Vivereퟘ�e’s mother, many wish to place the blame for such injuries at the feet of the police rather
than the ﬂeeing suspect. In those cases, where the police due pursue a suspect and the pursuit ends with
the suspect injured or killed, the police not only face criticism from the public, but the department and
the individual oﬃcers involved become the subject of a civil rights lawsuit.

TRADITIONAL POLICE METHODS USED TO END HIGH SPEED
PURSUITS
In aퟘ�empting to terminate a police pursuit there are a variety of tactics an oﬃcer may use. Oﬃcers may
aퟘ�empt to “box” a vehicle (hퟘ�ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fX9VlxkGlgY) in by placing cruisers
around the suspect’s vehicle and gradually slowing their own speed, forcing the driver to stop. Other
methods include using spike stops (hퟘ�ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Wqx‑PTeWUw) or the most
notable precision immobilization technique (hퟘ�ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qqn8pqsUA8Y), also
known as the “PIT maneuver.” During a PIT maneuver, the pursuing oﬃcer uses their front push
bumper to strike a ﬂeeing vehicles rear quarter panel/bumper of the vehicle, causing the vehicle to spin
and end the pursuit. While these are the most common methods, they are not the only methods to end a
pursuit. Each of these methods can involve a high degree of danger for the pursuing oﬃcers, the public
and the ﬂeeing suspect, as evident by this video (hퟘ�ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKJCjbUI6t8),
where a ﬂeeing suspect crashes into a police cruiser while trying to avoid spike strips.

CASE LAW PROTECTING POLICE USE OF FORCE DURING HIGH
SPEED PURSUITS
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of use of force in the context of police pursuits only four
times. Two of their decisions dealt with vehicles aퟘ�empting to ﬂee a scene while oﬃcers were nearby.
The other two, discussed below, addressed the police use of force during the actual high speed pursuit.
In each case, the Supreme Court found that either the oﬃcer involved did not violate the Fourth
Amendment or was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity under 42 U.S.C section 1983
(hퟘ�ps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983).
The Supreme Court in 2007 ﬁrst addressed the Fourth Amendment and use of force during a police
vehicle pursuit. In Scoퟘ� v. Harris (hퟘ�ps://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05‑1631.pdf), an
oﬃcer was found to not have violated the Fourth Amendment when the oﬃcer rammed a ﬂeeing
suspect oﬀ the road. Harris was rendered a quadriplegic after leading the police on a six‑minute chase
(hퟘ�ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrVKSgRZ2GY) that ended when Scoퟘ� used the push bumper of
his cruiser to ram Harris’ vehicle, causing it to veer oﬀ into a ditch. The Court held that Scoퟘ� did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because Harris was an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any
pedestrians who might have been present, other civilian motorists and the oﬃcers involved in the chase.
Harris argued that police should have ceased the pursuit instead of ramming his vehicle, and by ceasing

Harris argued that police should have ceased the pursuit instead of ramming his vehicle, and by ceasing
the pursuit the public would have been equally protected. The Court refused to adopt a rule that would
give incentives for suspects to escape simply by speeding, running red lights, and endangering the
public. Rather, the Court adopted the more sensible rule that “police oﬃcer’s aퟘ�empt to terminate a
dangerous high speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, even when it places the ﬂeeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”
The Supreme Court’s second decision involving police pursuits came just last year in November 2015,
with the case of Mullenix v. Luna (hퟘ�ps://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14‑1143). On March 23, 2010, Israel
Leija Jr., lead police on high speed pursuit. During the 18‑minute chase, Leija and the pursuing oﬃcers
reached speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour. Leija phoned the local police dispatcher while
ﬂeeing and told them he had a gun and threatened to shoot at the police if they did not abandon their
pursuit. The dispatcher promptly relayed this information to all the oﬃcers involved.
While other oﬃcers pursued Leija, Trooper Mullenix drove to an overpass intending to set up a spike
strip. Directly below the overpass another oﬃcer waited with a spike strip already deployed. Mullenix
decided to consider a diﬀerent tactic, shooting at the vehicle to disable it however, Mullenix was not
trained in such a procedure. As Leija’s vehicle approached the overpass, Mullenix ﬁred six shots,
striking Leija four times in the upper body. Leija’s vehicle continued under the overpass, struck the spike
strips, hit a median, and rolled. Leija was killed in the incident.
Relying on its precedent, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts ﬁnding that Mullenix did not
have qualiﬁed immunity. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Mullenix was entitled to qualiﬁed
immunity because his actions did not violate clearly established precedent beyond debate.

CONCLUSION
While some continue to call for the police to stop pursuing only the most egregious or dangerous
felonies in the name of public safety, perhaps it is more appropriate for departments to authorize oﬃcers
to end high speed pursuits in an expedited manner. A ﬂeeing suspect in a motor vehicle becomes a high
speed missile aimed at the nearest unlucky innocent bystander who’s done nothing more than be in the
wrong place at the wrong time. In contrast, it is the suspect who has made the decision to ﬂee in a motor
vehicle, placing the public in danger. Perhaps this is why the Supreme Court has never found an oﬃcer’s
actions in a high‑speed pursuit to be unreasonable. As Justice Scalia in Scoퟘ� opined,
“we think it appropriate in this process to take into account…their relative culpability. It was [Harris], after all,
who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger…”
By adopting a policy that reﬂects these case precedents, police oﬃcers will have the ability, with the
constitutional authority, to end high‑speed pursuits quickly before the public can be harmed. Rather
than chase a suspect’s vehicle for 11‑minutes or blame the police, perhaps it is time that society places
the blame at the feet of the individual who made the conscious decision to endanger the public. By
allowing the police to quickly intervene, this will reduce a suspect’s ability to crash into innocent
motorist or pedestrians. In addition, those cases brought by suspects claiming a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for a tactic during a high‑speed pursuit that resulted in injury or death to the suspect, trial
courts should evaluate each case beginning with a rebuퟘ�able presumption that a suspect who ﬂees in a
motor vehicle poses a danger to the public and oﬃcers. With this presumption, it is evident by Supreme
Court precedent that when the police use tactics that include the use of deadly force to stop a high‑speed
pursuit, the actions by the oﬃcers do not violate the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable seizures.
By adopting a policy that reﬂects this precedent, perhaps more innocent lives like Charlie Vivereퟘ�e, can
be spared and the culpability of a high‑speed pursuit can be placed where it rightfully belongs.
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